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DID THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT PROPERLY
DECIDE STATE V HOOK?
ROBERT K. REEVE*
The condition of the Indians in relation to the United
States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in
existence.... [T]he relation of the Indians to the United
States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions
which exist no where else.
- Chief Justice John Marshall.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1991, the North Dakota Supreme Court held in
State v. Hook that state police and courts may exercise limited
criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the Devils Lake Sioux Indian
reservation lands.2 The Hook decision overruled established pre-
cedent and ran contrary to the will of the people voiced through
the North Dakota state legislature. A close analysis of Hook in
light of current federal policies enunciated by the Supreme Court,
promulgated by Congress, and embodied in North Dakota's legis-
lative history as well as its case law leads this author to conclude:
because the legislature of North Dakota has specifically declined to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands, state
police and state courts lack authority to do so. Moreover, the state,
when attempting to exercise jurisdiction over Indians on Indian
lands, infringes on important tribal interests of self-government.
Finally, overriding federal policies toward tribal self-determina-
tion preempt the state from seeking to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over Indians on Indian lands.
* B.A., Brigham Young University; M.P.A., Brigham Young University; M.S.
(Philosophy), University of Utah; J.D., University of North Dakota. The author especially
appreciates the inspiration of Gene DeLorme, Assistant Dean at UND, who taught a
seminar in Indian law; and the perspiration of Eric Molberg, editor in chief of the North
Dakota Law Review, who edited the early drafts of this article.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831).
2. 476 N.W.2d 565, 571 (N.D. 1991). The Hook court expressly limited its holding to
'non-major" misdemeanor crimes. Id. at 571. The Hook court provided citations of federal
district court cases which construe Congressional enactments of state jurisdiction as having
a limited nature. Id. at n.6 (alluding to Iowa Tribe of Indians v. State of Kansas, 787 F.2d
1434 (10th Cir. 1986); Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Iowa 1976), aff'd, 549
F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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II. THE FACTUAL SETTING OF STATE V. HOOK
Terrance Hook sped along U.S. Highway 20 on April 7, 1989,
some three miles south of Devils Lake.3 North Dakota State High-
way Patrol officer Gerald Buchli saw the speeding vehicle and
gave chase.4 As the two vehicles entered the Devils Lake Sioux
Indian Reservation, Buchli turned on the cruiser's overhead warn-
ing lights.5 Police of the Bureau of Indian Affairs had erected a
roadblock, forcing Hook and Buchli to stop.6 Buchli promptly
arrested Hook and took him directly to the Law Enforcement
Center in Devils Lake, ignoring both Bureau of Indian Affairs
police and codified extradition procedures of the Devils Lake
Sioux Tribe.
7
During booking, police discovered that Hook, an enrolled
member of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe, had a blood alcohol level
of .13 and that he had been driving with a suspended North
3. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 565 (N.D. 1991).
4. Id. Buchli spotted Hook's vehicle on U.S. Highway 20 some three miles south of
Devils Lake in Ramsey County. Id. North Dakota defines "fresh pursuit" as that which the
common law does not cover, thereby enabling a member of a duly organized state, county,
or municipal law enforcement unit of North Dakota or of another state of the United States
to pursue a person who has committed or who is reasonably suspected of having committed
a felony, misdemeanor, or traffic violation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-07 (1991). For a
definition of what the common law covers by "fresh pursuit," see Cattus v. State, 105 A.2d
661, 666 (Md. 1954) (permitting an officer to pursue only felons or suspected felons with or
without an arrest warrant into another jurisdiction to execute a lawful arrest).
5. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 565.
6. Id. Buchli literally took Hook out of the hands of sworn and certified peace officers
who possessed federally-vested authority to arrest Hook on or off the reservation. For a
brief discussion on the extent of authority vested in Bureau of Indian Affairs Police, see
Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 573 (1976) (requiring that a Bureau of Indian
Affairs officer report and investigate all violations of any state, federal, or tribal law or
regulation personally or vicariously observed which Indians and non-Indians commit and
which occur on or off the reservation). Regarding a comprehensive list of Bureau of Indian
Affairs officer's duties, see 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.301-.306 (1991).
7. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 565. The record gives no clue as to why Buchli refused to turn
over Hook to tribal peace officers and comply with the tribal reservation extradition
procedures. Id. However, in October 1987, the Devils Lake Tribal Council by resolution
A05-87-145 suspended all-cross-deputization and gave written notice to the North Dakota
State Highway Patrol that it no longer had authority to make arrests on the Devils Lake
Sioux Indian Reservation. Brief of Appellant A-32, State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565 (N.D.
1991) (No. 900280-900282) (available at University of North Dakota Thormodsgard Law
Library). For a listing of the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation extradition procedures,
see I DEVILs LAKE Sioux TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE, Title III, § 3-9-101 (1988)
(permitting extradition of any person residing within the reservation for whom a court of
any state in the United States has issued an arrest warrant and who lies beyond the
jurisdiction of the tribal court). North Dakota's fresh pursuit statute does not expressly
authorize state peace officers to exercise jurisdiction on Indian reservation land. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-06-05 (1991) (acknowledging fresh pursuit of police from any duly
organized state, county, or municipal law enforcement unit only). Seizing Hook and
immediately heading for jurisdictional turf in Ramsey County suggests Buchli's awareness
of his lack of jurisdiction on the reservation. See Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 565.
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Dakota driver's license.' Police charged Hook with driving under
the influence, driving on a suspended license, and attempting to
elude a peace officer.'
Hook moved to suppress all evidence obtained incident to the
arrest for lack of jurisdiction.' 0 The state had neither complied
with the tribe's extradition procedures nor obtained tribal consent
in the state's fresh pursuit of Hook." However, the trial court
refused to follow North Dakota's forty years of precedent in State
v. Lohnes,'2 which had precluded state law enforcement from
exercising jurisdiction over criminal matters involving Indians on
reservations.' 3 Relying instead on cases pertaining to fishing rights
and felonies occurring off the reservation, the trial court ruled that
state police had jurisdiction to enter the Devils Lake Sioux Reser-
vation and arrest Hook for a misdemeanor violation occurring on
the reservation.' 4 Finally, the trial court found that Congress, in
passing the Act of May 31, 1946, had vested the state with jurisdic-
tion over Indians committing misdemeanor offenses on Devils
8. Id. Buchli did not administer a sobriety test while on reservation premises, instead
transporting Hook directly to the Law Enforcement Center in Devils Lake. Id.
9. Id. The charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer could result in a
conviction of a class A misdemeanor in North Dakota. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-71
(1987).
10. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 565.
11. Id.
12. 69 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1955).
13. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 565-66. For references indicating lack of statutory
jurisdiction over criminal offenses on Indian reservations, see infra notes 147-57 and
accompanying text; 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) (defining Indian country as all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government,
including any patent-issued lands and rights-of-way running through reservations, all
dependent Indian communities within United States borders, and all Indian allotments of
unextinguished titles); Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 490 (8th. Cir. 1988) (stating that
Indian tribes have power to enforce their criminal laws against tribal members); Ortiz-
Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th. Cir. 1975) (recognizing an Indian tribe's
authority to exercise complete criminal jurisdiction over its members and within the limits
of the reservation subordinate only to the expressed limitations of federal law); Davis v.
O'Keffe, 283 N.W.2d 73, 75 n.1, 76 (N.D. 1979) (noting how the North Dakota Legislature
has not provided a method for the state's assuming criminal jurisdiction over Indian
reservations while acknowledging that a tribe generally possesses authority to control entry
into its reservation and to deliver to state authorities tribal members suspected of
committing a state offense). Yet the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the validity of
police to make a warrantless felony arrest on an Indian Reservation for an off-reservation
crime despite absence of any agreement with the tribe for removing suspects from the
reservation. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 465-67 (N.D. 1968).
14. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 565-66. The Hook majority indicated that the trial court had
relied on the principles of Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1962)
(regulating non-reservation Indians' use of fish-traps by the state as not interfering with the
tribal self-government or impairing a right granted or reserved under federal law); and
Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 467 (N.D. 1968) (upholding state jurisdiction to enter
(no fresh pursuit here) and seize an Indian on a reservation for a crime allegedly committed
off the reservation since doing so ostensively did not interfere with the reservation's self-
government despite violating tribal extradition procedures).
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Lake Sioux Indian Reservation.1 5 Hook entered a conditional plea
to the charges and immediately appealed.'6
III. THE PREMISES UNDERLYING STATE V. LOHNES
A. THE FACTS
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Hook agreed with the
trial court and overruled Lohnes."7 Briefly reviewing Lohnes pro-
vides an appropriate context before unpacking Hook to try and
find its rationale. On July 1, 1954, Leonard Lohnes hit his wife
Mary Lohnes several times while both resided on the Devils Lake
Sioux Indian Reservation.' 8 The state's attorney's office filed an
information with the state court in Benson County, charging
Lohnes with assault and battery, a misdemeanor.1 9 Lohnes pled
15. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 566 n.I (citing in significant part, The Act of May 31, 1946, 60
Stat. 229). The act in its entirety provides as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the
State of North Dakota over offenses committed by or against Indians on the
Devils Lake Indian Reservation in North Dakota to the same extent as its courts
have jurisdiction generally over offenses committed within said State outside of
Indian reservations: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall
deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by
the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on said
reservation, nor shall anything herein contained deprive any Indian of any
protection afforded by Federal law, contract, or treaty against the taxation or
alienation of any restricted property.
Act of May 31, 1946, Pub. L. No. 394, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229.
The North Dakota State Attorney General, in an amicus curiae brief calling for the
North Dakota Supreme Court to deny the state criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian
lands until North Dakota amended its constitutional disclaimer section, quoted the United
States Attorney General's interpretation of the 1946 Act. Brief of the Attorney General of
the State of North Dakota as Amicus Curiae 14, State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1955)
(No. Cr. 264) (available at University of North Dakota Thormodsgard Law Library). The
United States Attorney General opined that the 1946 act could confer on the state concur-
rent jurisdiction over the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation. Id. at 10. However, the
Hook court only held that the state could exercise criminal jurisdiction over the "non-
major" (misdemeanor) offenses committed on the reservation. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 571.
Generally, federal courts exercise jurisdiction over sixteen categories of felony offenses
which involve Indians on Indian reservation lands. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988) (providing
for the federal government's exercising sole and exclusive jurisdiction for punishment of
Indians on Indian country); 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988) (subjecting any Indian to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States who commits enumerated felonies). Tribes exercise juris-
diction over Indian defendants on Indian reservation lands for all offenses not covered in
the federal statute. See id.; supra note 13 and accompanying text (construing section 1152
as granting tribes exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members in Ortiz-Barraza and Grey-
water). However, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
limit the ability of the tribe to impose a maximum of a one year jail sentence, a fine of
$5,000 fine or both for each crime charged. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988) (defining the extent
of tribal punishment); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat.
3207 (extending tribal punishment to a maximum of one year in jail, $5,000 fine, or both).
16. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 566.
17. Id. at 570-71.
18. State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508, 516-17 (N.D. 1955). Leonard and Mary Lohnes
maintained membership in the Devils Lake Sioux Reservation. Id. at 517.
19. Id. at 509.
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guilty to the charges but appealed the judgment to the North
Dakota Supreme Court for want of state court jurisdiction.2 0 The
court in Lohnes determined that, as enrolled members of the res-
ervation, Leonard and Mary Lohnes had attained the status of
wards2 ' and thus came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the fed-
eral government.
B. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS INDICATES A LACK OF STATE
JURISDICTION
To establish absolute federal jurisdiction and control over
enrolled members of the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation,
the Lohnes court traced the history of agreements-primarily
treaties and statutes-between Indian tribes in North Dakota and
the federal government.2 2 Essentially, the Organic Law, which
Congress passed on March 2, 1861, established the Territory of
Dakota and provided for territorial government.23 Congress par-
ticularly stated that nothing in the Organic Law would impair the
rights and property of the Indians in the newly formed territory.2 4
On April 15, 1867, the federal government entered into a treaty
with the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Sioux, permitting the
Indians to adopt rules and regulations for their effective self-gov-
ernment and setting aside a specific portion of the Dakota Terri-
tory for exclusive Indian use.25
20. Id. at 510. Because of the significant jurisdictional question, counsel for both
defendant Lohnes and the state applied for certification to the North Dakota Supreme
Court. Id.
21. Id. at 516.
22. Id. at 509-16. The Lohnes court stated that contextually setting out the historical
framework would shed light on the meaning of the phrase "absolute jurisdiction and control
over Indian lands." Id. at 512. To appreciate the value of historical analysis in
understanding the exclusion of state jurisdiction, the sovereignty of the tribe, and the
special trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government, see FELIX S.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 48-49 (1982 ed.).
23. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 510 (referencing Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 86, 12 Stat. 239).
24. Id. The Lohnes court quoted the disclaimer language of the Organic Act:
Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the
rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in said Territory, so
long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the United
States and such Indians * * * or to affect the authority of the government of the
United States to make any regulations respecting such Indians, their lands,
property, or other rights, by treaty, law, or otherwise, which it would have been
competent for the government to make if this act had never passed * * *
State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508, 510 (N.D. 1955) (quoting Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 86, 12
Stat. 239). In other words, non-Indian inhabitants had to respect individual and property
rights of Indians in the Dakota Territory and to refrain from usurping federal authority over
the Indians. See id.
25. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 510-11.
Congress ratified the treaty by legislative enactment. Id. at 511 (citing Treaty with
Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, amended and accepted, April 22,
1867, 15 Stat. 505). The reservation lands represented the federal government's way of
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In 1889, Congress passed the Enabling Act, leading to a divi-
sion of the Dakota Territory and statehood for, among others,
North Dakota.26 One condition of the Enabling Act required that,
to become a state, North Dakota would have to relinquish forever
all rights and title to any lands owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribe.27 North Dakota responded by including in its state
constitution a disclaimer which paralleled the conditional require-
ment in the federal Enabling Act. 28 The state, while acknowledg-
rewarding the Sisseton and Wahpeton for not joining the Sioux Indian outbreak in 1862. Id.
at 510. Moreover, these bands had requested federal assistance in order to convert to an
agricultural life style since their hunting lands were fast disappearing to the non-Indian
settlers. Id. Finally, a federal government agent had to approve all such band rules and
regulations. Id. at 511.
The federal government amended the treaty in 1872, by which the Sioux bands ceded
to the federal government all rights, titles, and interest in the territory described in the
1867 treaty save for more limited reservation lands. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 510 (referencing
Act of June 7, 1872, ch. 325, 17 Stat. 281). In consideration of relinquishing the land, the
Sioux bands would receive $80,000 for use in converting to an agricultural-based
civilization. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 14, 1873, ch. 138, 17 Stat. 456). Congress, in amending
the treaty, still retained exclusive jurisdiction over the rights and lands of the Indians on the
newly established Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation. Id. Throughout the treaty-
enacting period of the 1860s and 1870s, Congress negotiated with the Dakota Territory-
based Indian bands by either enacting legislation or ratifying treaties. See id.
26. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 511. In addition to North Dakota, the act led to statehood
creation for South Dakota, Montana, and Washington. Id. (citing to Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch.
180, § 1 and 4, 25 Stat. 676-77).
27. Id. at 511. The act also clearly provided that all Indian lands within the states shall
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of Congress. Id. The federal
government had to protect the Indians from fraud at the hands of their newly settled and
ambitious non-Indian neighbors. Id. at 512. That the Enabling Act did not repeat verbatim
the reservation of rights of Indians within the newly created states nevertheless implies
continued protection of such rights by the federal government. See COHEN, supra note 22,
at 222-24 (construing ambiguous treaty expressions in favor of the Indians, i.e., as the
Indians would have understood them (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (construing liberally statutes, agreements, and executive orders
dealing with Indian affairs so as to favor establishing Indian rights)). For an extended
discussion as to the necessity of including in state constitutions specific disclaimers over
Indian land, see Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over
Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535, 570 (1975) (requiring that states include
disclaimers in state constitutions as indicative of the federal government's continued
"obligation to stand between two hostile groups" and prevent future exploitation of the
Indians) (citing DEP'T OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, STATE OF MONTANA, TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
AND LAW AND ORDER 30 (1968)).
28. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 511. The disclaimer language in North Dakota's state
constitution reads nearly identical to that of the Enabling Act. Id. (citing to Act of Feb. 22,
1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676; N.D. CONST. art. XVI, § 203 (1889)). Section 203 of the North
Dakota Constitution reads as follows:
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim
all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the
United States, and that said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States; * * * that no taxes
shall be imposed by this state on lands or property therein, belonging to, or
which may hereafter be purchased by the United States or reserved for its use.
N.D. CONST. art. XVI, § 203 (1889) (superseded by N.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(2) (emphasis
added). Essentially, section 203 disclaims state jurisdiction over proprietary interest in title
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ing absolute federal jurisdiction, thus ceded all rights and titles to
Indian and Indian tribe-owned land in North Dakota. 9
The Lohnes court buttressed its initial finding of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction and control over Indian lands by an appeal to
practicality. 30 As a brand-new state, North Dakota really could not
afford to extend its jurisdiction over Indian land and people, espe-
cially since the state had ceded to the federal government any
power to tax Indian property or land. 31 Having lost the hunting
grounds to non-Indian settlers, the Indians had become dependent
on federal subsidies and required considerable assistance in transi-
tioning from a hunting and gathering to an agricultural econ-
omy. 32  The federal government would have to financially
underwrite and continue to maintain jurisdiction over the Indians
and Indian land in North Dakota. 33
to Indian lands, political power of governance over Indian lands, and the power to tax per-
sonal property or land of the Indians. Id. For a comprehensive discussion of these three
provisions of state disclaimer clauses, see infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
29. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 511.
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the language of state disclaimer
clauses as ceding to the federal government jurisdiction over the Indians occupying Indian
reservation and village lands, i.e., "Indian country." See Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340,
342, 344-45, 354 (1907) (construing the Idaho constitutional disclaimer clause, which placed
Indian lands under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the federal government, to have
ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over both the Indians and their lands); In
re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905) (emancipating the Indian from federal control also requires
the consent of the Indian and the state); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 208 (1877) (interpreting
treaty clauses so as to make Indian country free from state or territorial jurisdiction despite
falling within the boundaries of a state or territory provided that the title to such Indian
country has not been extinguished).
The Lohnes court clarified a possible ambiguity in the Enabling Act and North Dakota's
constitutional disclaimer, an ambiguity which seemed to treat both the unappropriated
public lands and Indian-held or -owned lands as falling under exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 512. The state exercised its jurisdiction over unappropriated public
lands. Id. Yet the language in the Enabling Act and North Dakota's constitution limited
exclusive federal jurisdiction and control to Indian lands. Id. By contrast, the more general
language in both documents confined title in public unappropriated and Indian lands to the
federal government for disposition. Id. In other words, the federal government only had
exclusive jurisdiction over Indian lands while holding title over both Indian lands and
public unappropriated lands. Id. (alluding to State ex rel. Tompton v. Denoyer, 72 N.W.
1014, 1017 (N.D. 1897) (construing the Enabling Act's condition--"and that said Indian
land shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States"-as applying to Indian lands only and not to the matter of title).
30. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 513.
31. Id. By virtue of the Enabling Act and its constitutional disclaimer, North Dakota
could not tax the reservations for revenue. Id. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled
that no state may impose taxes over Indian reservation lands. See McClanahan v. State Tax
Comiss'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 178-81 (1973) (denying the state of Arizona tax
jurisdiction over the Navajo nation due to the long-standing tradition of Indian sovereignty
and independence and even despite not interfering with tribal self-government); STATE
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOUTH DAKOTA, JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN COUNTRY
IN SOUTH DAKOTA 11 (rev. version 1964) (estimating that assuming criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to Public Law 280 would at least double the enforcement costs for every affected
county in the state).
32. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 511.
33. Id. As early as 1784, the federal government included treaty language which
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C. FINDING LIMITED STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN
LANDS
The Lohnes court explained how the Supreme Court in
Draper v. United States had permitted states to exercise jurisdic-
tion only over non-Indians committing crimes on Indian reserva-
tion lands.34  State residents would enjoy all privileges and
immunities of the laws of North Dakota even when on Indian
lands.3" However, Congress and federal agents would retain juris-
diction over Indians on Indian lands.36
With the Act of May 31, 1946, Congress sought to extend to
the state of North Dakota jurisdiction over crimes occurring on the
Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation involving enrolled members
of the Sioux tribe.3 ' The Lohnes court construed the 1946 Act as
reducing the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction to concurrent juris-
diction.38 More significantly, the Lohnes court noted how the
1946 Act had transferred some of the exclusive jurisdiction over
Indians, jurisdiction previously reserved in the federal govern-
ment by the Enabling Act and granted by the state constitution, to
North Dakota. 39 But before exercising the jurisdiction spoken of
in the 1946 Act, North Dakota would have to amend its state con-
stitution as it had done to comply with the Congressional condition
set forth in the Enabling Act.4 ° Congress in the Enabling Act
would not grant statehood to sections of the Dakota territory
unless such territorial sections, in this case, North Dakota, gave up
all claims, titles, and interests in Indian lands within the state.41
characterized the Indians as dependent wards in need of protection. COHEN, supra note
22, at 60 (drawing from Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15).
34. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 515 (referencing Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242-
43 (1896)).
35. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 516 (borrowing from State ex rel. Tompton v. Denoyer, 72
N.W. 1014, 1019 (N.D. 1897) (permitting the state the right to extend to its citizens lawfully
on Indian lands all privileges and immunities of the laws of the state so as to not conflict
with the reserved jurisdiction of the federal government over Indian lands)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 516. However, Congress added one significant caveat--nothing in the 1946
act would deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over crimes listed under federal law which
Indians would commit. Id. See supra note 15 for the text of the act's limiting qualification.
Congress intended to reserve for the United States felony and other specifically
enumerated offenses covered under federal statute committed by one Indian on the person
of another Indian in Indian country. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (aXb) (1988) (listing the felony
offenses that come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States).
38. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 516.
39. Id. at 517.
40. Id. (citing the Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676 (requiring that state
constitutional conventions enact disclaimers which would remain "irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of said States")).
41. Id. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (listing the substantive sections of the
disclaimer clause).
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North Dakota complied by including in its state constitution sec-
tion 203 of article 16 wherein the state recognized jurisdiction
over all Indian lands as residing exclusively in the federal
government.42
D. IDENTIFYING A COMPACT THAT REQUIRES THE
CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO CREATE AND
MODIFY MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS
The Lohnes court noted how North Dakota had treated the
compliant act in section 203 of article 16 as a compact in its state
constitution, a compact between the federal and the state govern-
ment.43 To have effect, compacts require consent of the compact-
ing parties (the people of the United States and the people of
North Dakota).44 The people of the United States consented to its
retaining exclusive jurisdiction over Indian lands in North Dakota
through Congress's passing the Enabling Act.45 The people of
North Dakota, in turn, consented by incorporating into its state
constitution a complete acquiescence to exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over all Indian lands in North Dakota.46
Through the Act of May 31, 1946, the people of the United
States had consented to North Dakota's assuming limited criminal
jurisdiction over the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation.47 Sim-
ilarly, the people of North Dakota would have to consent to exer-
cising a degree of jurisdiction over offenses committed on the
Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation in 1946.48 Before permit-
ting North Dakota to exercise jurisdiction, the people of North
Dakota would have to express their consent again by amending
42. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 517 (quoting N.D. CONST. art. XVI, § 203 (1889)
(acknowledging "'that said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress of the United States' ")).
43. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 517. Section 203, containing the disclaimer condition
necessary for statehood, begins with the following heading: COMPACT WITH THE
UNITED STATES. N.D. CONST. art. XVI, § 203 (1889) (superseded by N.D. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1(2)). Furthermore, the preface to section 203 declares that the section's contents
"shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of this state."
Id. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARtY 281 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a compact as a contract
between parties which creates enforceable rights and obligations and as an agreement
based on the mutual consent of the parties).
44. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 517. The Lohnes court merely reiterated how compacts
operate. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id. In other words, Congress had required that North Dakota officially concede any
jurisdictional claim over Indian lands as a necessary pre-condition of statehood. Id. The
people of North Dakota acknowledged exclusive federal jurisdiction through a
constitutional amendment in 1889. Id.
47. Id. The Lohnes court viewed the 1946 act as "consent by the United States" to
change the original provision governing jurisdiction over the Indians. Id.
48. Id.
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the state constitution.49
The Lohnes court could find no instance where the people of
North Dakota had consented to exercising jurisdiction over the
Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation as permitted in the 1946
act.5 0 In the absence of a constitutional amendment, the original
compact of 1889, the one based on consent between the people of
the United States and of North Dakota, remained in effect.5 The
federal government continued to exercise exclusive and absolute
jurisdiction over all offenses committed by Indians on the Devils
Lake Sioux Indian Reservation.5 2 The state thus lacked jurisdic-
tion to try enrolled tribal member Leonard Lohnes for the misde-
meanor charge of assault and battery, an act which occurred on an
Indian reservation, in the County Court of Increased Jurisdiction
of Benson County.53
IV. THE PREMISES UNDERYLING STATE V. HOOK
A. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
After correctly identifying the overriding issue-whether
North Dakota has criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses
committed by an Indian on the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reserva-
tion-the Hook court enumerated two governing 'principles': fed-
eral law comprises the primary source of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country;54 and Congress may completely divest the unique
and limited sovereignty that Indian tribes retain.55 From these
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 517.
52. Id. The Lohnes court termed the federal government's continued jurisdiction as
over the Devils Lake reservation as "absolute." Id.
53. Id. See Bench and Bar, 30 N.D. L. REv. 462 (1954). The Indian Affairs Committee
of the North Dakota State Bar Association had undertaken its own survey of the four
reservations in North Dakota. Id. The committee determined that state courts definitively
lacked jurisdiction over crimes committed on three of the Indian reservations involving
Indians and probably lacked it on the fourth, i.e., Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation. Id.
at 463. The committee noted the lack of an affirmative act of state consent and further that
the provision in the state constitution disclaiming jurisdiction created considerable doubt
on state courts having criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands. Id. The
determination stemmed from a comprehensive survey of Supreme Court and state court
decisions as well as an historical review of the development of reservations in North Dakota.
ld. at 463-70. The committee had further reviewed Public Law 280 and recommended
that the state legislature amend section 203 on disclaiming jurisdiction preparatory to the
state's assuming jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands. Id. at 463, 469.
54. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 567 (referencing COHEN, supra note 22, at 282).
55. Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). However, the
Wheeler dicta, which the Hook court conspicuously omitted, indicates that Congress never
has divested the tribes of authority to punish for criminal offenses committed by Indians on
Indian reservations. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 (1978). Moreover, the
Wheeler court identified the tribe's criminal jurisdiction to punish its own members on its
own land as inherent sovereign authority that pre-dates the 'discovery' of the Indians by the
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two 'principles,' the Hook court concluded that states only have
criminal jurisdiction over Indians on an Indian reservation when
Congress so allows.56
B. THE LOHNES DISSENT
Having defined its guiding 'principles,' the Hook court set out
to discredit the underlying premises on which Lohnes had rested
for nearly four decades.57 The Hook court briefly alluded to the
Lohnes holding: Because the respective people of the United
States and North Dakota, having compacted to disclaim state juris-
diction over Indian lands as a pre-condition for statehood, both
must consent to any change in that compact.5 8 Next, the Hook
court quoted verbatim a significant portion of the dissent in
Lohnes which asserted that the disclaimer language did not have a
territorial nature over Indians and therefore could not divest
North Dakota of its police powers.5 9 However, the dissent in
Lohnes failed to advance a single case in support of the claim that
the disclaimer section in North Dakota's constitution referred only
to land and not the Indian people residing on those lands.60 Fur-
thermore, if the disclaimer clause had referred only to land and in
no way impaired North Dakota from exercising its state police
powers over Indians on Indian reservation lands as the Lohnes dis-
Europeans. Id. at 322. The dependency status which the federal government enforced
onto the Indian tribes did not result in any loss of the tribe's criminal jurisdictional
sovereignty over its Indian members. Id. at 323-24.
56. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 567. The Hook court's conclusion logically follows from its
out-of-context 'principles.' However, the soundness of the two principles on which the
conclusion rests remains suspect for want of qualifying context. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
57. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 567.
58. Id. at 567-68.
59. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 568 (citing State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508, 521 (N.D. 1955)).
After quoting section 203 of the state constitution (supra note 28 and accompanying
text) where the state agreed to cede absolute jurisdiction and control of Indian lands to
Congress, the Lohnes dissent argued that such disclaimer language dealt primarily with
lands and not people, with the soil and not those residing thereon. State v. Lohnes, 69
N.W.2d 508, 518 (N.D. 1955) (Morris, J., dissenting) (citing N.D. CONST. art. XVI § 203
(1889)).
Cohen, however, explains that beginning with Wisconsin in 1836 and especially
continuing through the period from 1889 to 1959, Congress included clauses expressly
preserving Indian rights and federal jurisdiction over tribes in most organic acts
establishing new territories. COHEN, supra note 22, at 268. The organic act establishing
the Dakota Territory specifically provided that the act would not impair the individual or
property rights of the Indian provided that such rights remain intact by treaty between the
federal government and the Indians. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 86, 12 Stat. 239. Moreover,
the tribe had to consent to any changes in land or jurisdiction. Id. Congress required that
territories seeking to become states include a constitutional disclaimer of jurisdiction clause
as to Indian lands plus an acknowledgment of the federal government's overriding
authority of the Indian lands. COHEN, supra note 22, at 268 n.72.
60. See State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508, 518 (N.D. 1955) (Morris, J., dissenting).
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sent had maintained, Congress had no reason to enact the May 31,
1946 Act.
The Lohnes dissent then quoted a large section of the dicta in
Draper v. United States in which the Supreme Court refused to
construe Montana's constitutional disclaimer clause as yielding to
the federal government jurisdiction over criminal offenses com-
mitted on Indian lands by non-Indians.6" From Draper, the
Lohnes dissent concluded that the disclaimer clause only pertains
to land and not people.6" The Hook court, making no attempt to
reconcile the inconsistencies in the Lohnes dissent, drew the infer-
ence that, when Congress withdraws its exclusive jurisdiction such
as in the 1946 Act, the state may fill the void without having to
modify the state's constitutional compact, specifically its jurisdic-
tional disclaimer section.63
C. SELECTIVELY REFERENCING COHEN
As if to provide support for the Lohnes dissent, the Hook court
relied on some premises advanced by Indian scholar Felix S.
Cohen concerning the Lohnes holding.6 Cohen, citing the
Lohnes majority, noted that North Dakota in fact had relinquished
jurisdiction over Indian lands through a two-party compact based
in part on a state constitutional amendment and another on a con-
gressional act.65 However, relying on the Cohen premises, the
Hook court argued that only one party, i.e., the people of the
United States vis 6 vis a congressional act, could unilaterally alter
the compact.66 Therefore, the Hook court undertook to under-
61. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 518-19 (citing Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 243-44
(1896)).
The Lohnes dissent ignored the significant reference in Draper that its holding in no
way affected McBratney. See Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242-43 (1896). In
McBratney, the Court determined that Colorado's disclaimer clause did not preclude the
state of Colorado from exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians on
Indian reservations while also finding no question at issue as to Congress' continued
regulation of crimes committed by Indians on reservation lands. United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382
(1886) (limiting state jurisdiction since Congress had defined a crime committed by an
Indian on Indian land within the state as falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government and punishable in federal courts).
62. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d at 520.
63. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 568 (N.D. 1991).
64. Id. (quoting COHEN, supra note 22, at 374 n.229). A board of authors and editors
rather than Cohen, who died in 1953, prepared the 1982 edition of Cohen's handbook.
COHEN, supra note 22, at iii. Cohen's original work, first published in 1942 and never
updated by Cohen thereafter, contains no reference to Lohnes. See F. COHEN'S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1986 ed.). However, noted scholars in Indian law comprise the
board of authors and editors of Cohen's 1982 edition. COHEN, supra note 22, at iii.
65. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 568 (quoting COHEN, supra note 22, at 374 n.229).
66. Id. But see United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903). The Supreme Court
denied South Dakota jurisdiction to tax personal property of Indians residing on reservation
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stand what Congress had intended upon passing the Act of May
31, 1946.67
But the Hook court curiously omitted the remaining premises
as well as the conclusion to Cohen's argument. Cohen speculated
that, because of the Supremacy Clause, Congress "probably" has
the power to withdraw its exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Indi-
ans committing crimes on Indian lands without state consent.6
Furthermore, while the correct inquiry begins with whether Con-
gress intended to break the compact and require state jurisdiction
without state consent, Cohen could find no indication of such
intent.6 9 Cohen cautioned interested parties not to presume such
an intent.7 0 Therefore, Cohen concluded that the Lohnes decision
seems correct.7 '
Cohen's endorsement of Lohnes in the absence of contrary
congressional intent normally would shift the inquiry to what the
state legislature of North Dakota has intended regarding state
criminal jurisdiction over the Devils Lake reservation. 72  How-
ever, the Hook court does not raise the issue of state legislative
intent anywhere in its opinion.
D. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Ignoring the question of state legislative intent, the Hook
court instead proceeded to divine congressional intent that Cohen
could not identify.73 As indication of Congress's intent to confer
lands because of the disclaimer provision in South Dakota's constitution. Id. at 441. The
Court declared that the disclaimer provision remained irrevocable without the consent of
the United States and the people of the state of South Dakota as expressed by their
legislative assembly. Id. at 440-41. The action of the United States in virtue of the
Enabling Act and the state of South Dakota through its constitutional disclaimer constitutes
a 'compact.' Id. at 441. The disclaimer provision, which denies South Dakota the authority
to tax Indian reservation property, continued as the law for its legislature and its people. Id.
The state of South Dakota would have to abrogate the disclaimer clause before the Court
could consider the state's jurisdiction to tax Indian reservation property. Id As such, the
Court maintained that no county in South Dakota had the authority to tax Indian personal
property on Indian reservations. Id.
67. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 568.
68. Id. (referencing COHEN, supra note 22, at 374 n.229).
69. COHEN, supra note 22, at 374 n.229.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. For a discussion of the North Dakota Legislature's intent to not confer criminal
jurisdiction over Indian reservations, see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
73. See Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 568. The Hook court, in a parenthetical footnote
reference, reproduced a 1945 letter purported to be from the Secretary of Interior to the
President of the Senate. Id. at 569 n.5. The Hook court may have relied on defendant
Hook's appellate brief which contains a reprint of the interior secretary's letter to the house
speaker. Brief of Appellant A-33, A-34, State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1991)
(No.900280-900282) (available at University of North Dakota Thormodsgard Law Library)
(citing S. REP. No. 997, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1946)). In the letter, the interior secretary
acknowledged having received a resolution from the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe, urging state
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jurisdiction to a state sans amending its constitutional disclaimer
clause, the Hook court relied on the trial court's selection of cases,
notably Organized Village of Kake v. Egan and Fournier v.
Roed.74
In Kake, a Thlinget Indian fishing village sought to preempt
state regulation of its fishing rights based on a disclaimer of juris-
diction in the Alaska Statehood Act over Indian property.75
Before Alaska became a state in 1959, the Thlinget obtained fed-
eral permits to use fish traps.76 Following statehood, Alaska
criminal jurisdiction over its lands. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 569 n.5. However, the Hook court
did not include a copy of the resolution nor give any researchable reference. Id.
The resolution, which accompanied the letter claimed that, because state courts had
exercised criminal jurisdiction over Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation for years and
because no tribal court existed on the reservation, the tribe by a vote of 88 to 1 desired to
continue under state court jurisdiction and sought federal legislation to make official such
jurisdiction. Brief of Appellant A-34, State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1991)
(No.900280-900282) (available at University of North Dakota Thormodsgard Law Library)
(citing S. REP. No. 997, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)).
Yet current leadership of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe has failed to locate a signed copy
of the purported resolution. Telephone interview with the Honorable Andrew Morin,
Judge, Devils Lake Tribal Court (Apr. 13, 1992). Interestingly, Judge Morin had located
two tribal resolutions bearing the signature of Charles Blackbird, the only name that
appears on the 1944 resolution. Id. See S. REP. No. 997, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)
(reproducing an unsigned copy of a tribal resolution, bearing only the name of Blackbird);
Resolution, Devils Lake Sioux Tribe Executive Committee (Oct. 6, 1949) (bearing both the
name and the signature of Blackbird) (copy on file in UND Law Review Office); Resolution,
Devils Lake Sioux Advisory Committee (Dec. 1, 1949) (bearing both the name and the
signature of Blackbird) (copy on file in UND Law Review Office). Moreover, research of
tribal records indicates that 680 enrolled members over 18 years old resided on the Devils
Lake Sioux Indian Reservation in 1946. See Survey for Eligible Voters, Devils Lake Sioux
Tribal Enrollment Clerk, (Apr. 14, 1992) (copy on file in UND Law Review Office).
According to the tribal base roll, total enrollment for the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe came to
1130 in 1943. Id.
Finally, the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe can find no documentation showing that the state
courts prior to 1944 ever exercised criminal jurisdiction over Indians while on Devils Lake
Sioux Indian Reservation. Telephone interview with the Honorable Andrew Morin, Judge,
Devils Lake Tribal Court (Apr. 13, 1992). Tribal rules in effect in 1944 required a majority
vote of enrolled members for any action representing the entire tribe. Id. See DEVILS
LAKE SIOUX CONST. AND BY-LAws art. IX, § 1 (1981) (requiring majority approval from
eligible members for all proposed resolutions following an affirmative council vote). The
Wheeler-Howard Act implies that a majority of tribal members vote on matters affecting
the tribe. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 16, 17, 48 Stat. 987-88 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 476 (1988)). Assuming that a signed copy of the resolution exists, only 13% of the tribe
requested state jurisdiction, contravening the spirit if not the letter of federal legislation
and tribal code, each requiring majority votes on tribal matters. Telephone interview with
the Honorable Andrew Morin, Judge, Devils Lake Tribal Court (Apr. 13, 1992). The Bureau
of Indian Affairs appointed judges for the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe in the 1940s. Id. The
'CFR Court' and not state courts exercised criminal jurisdiction over enrolled members of
the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe. Id. Otherwise, defendant Lohnes would not have challenged
the state's jurisdiction.
74. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 570 (N.D. 1991) (citing Organized Village of Kake
v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458 (N.D. 1968)).
75. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 62 (1962). The Thlinget Indians of
the Kake Village, not part of any reservation, base their entire livelihood on salmon fishing.
Id. at 61.
76. Id. The federal government had purchased canneries on the islands of Angoon in
1948 and Kupreanof in 1950 on behalf of the Thlinget. Id. The Army Corps of Engineers
issued permits to the Thlinget for fish-traps in navigable waters off of the two islands. Id. In
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enacted an anti-fish-trap statute which it sought to enforce on the
Kake Village.77 The Supreme Court determined that the state's
regulating off-reservation fishing did not impair treaty-protected
reservation self-government. 78  More specifically, the Court con-
strued one provision of the disclaimer clause in section four of the
federal Alaska Statehood Act as not preventing Alaska from using
its political power to limit Indian fishing.7 9
The Hook court, not discussing the facts in Kake, correctly
observed that the disclaimer language in the Alaska enabling act
ran similar to enabling acts in other states, including North
Dakota. 0 In attempting to determine what Congress had meant
by the disclaimer language in the Alaska Statehood Act, the Hook
court selectively reprinted verbatim several paragraphs from
Kake which focused on the first of three component provisions
making up the disclaimer clause in section four, i.e., the provision
dealing with giving up proprietary interest in Indian land."' The
1960, the Secretary of the Interior granted permanent permits to the Thlinget to use fish-
traps at numerous sites near both islands. Id.
77. Id. Alaska state police in 1959 arrested the president of the Kake Village Council
and the foreman of the crew, the latter of which was setting one of the fish-traps. Id. at 62.
Kake Village unsuccessfully sought an injunction, after which the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case. Id. at 61.
78. Id. at 75-76.
79. Id. at 67, 75-76 (referencing Alaska Statehood Act, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958)). For a
discussion of the Enabling Act states having disclaimer provisions, see infra note 135 and
accompanying text.
80. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 570 (N.D. 1991). Alaska's disclaimer section reads
as follows:
Sec. 4 [Compact with United States; disclaimer of right and title to lands or other
property; taxation]. As a compact with the United States said State and its
people do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all rights and title to any
lands or other property not granted or confirmed to the State or its political
subdivisions by or under the authority of this Act, the right or title to which is
held by the United States or is subject to disposition by the United States, and to
any lands or other property (including fishing rights), the right or title to which
may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) or is
held by the United States in trust for said natives;... shall be and remain under
the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States until disposed of under
its authority except to such extent as the Congress has prescribed or may
hereafter prescribe, and except when held by individual natives in fee without
restrictions on alienation: Provided, That ... no taxes shall be imposed by said
State upon any lands or other property now owned or hereafter acquired by the
United States or which, as hereinabove set forth, may belong to said natives,
except to such extent as the Congress has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe,
and except when held by individual natives in fee without restrictions on
alienation.
Alaska Statehood Act, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (emphasis added). For a recitation of North
Dakota's disclaimer section 203, see supra note 28.
81. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 570 (N.D. 1991) (quoting from Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1962) (citing Alaska Statehood: Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 283-87 (1954)
(discussing how the disclaimer clause will not impair the state from exercising its police
power unless the clause also contains an express or implied reservation of exclusive federal
jurisdiction)).
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Hook court interpreted the Supreme Court in Kake as concluding
that the disclaimer language of section four in the Alaska statute
disclaimed a proprietary interest in the land itself but not govern-
mental interest.8 2
However, the Hook court construed the entire disclaimer
clause in section four of Alaska's Statehood Act as dealing with a
proprietary interest in land."' Yet the Supreme Court in Kake
specifically pointed out that only one provision of the disclaimer
clause disclaimed the state's proprietary interest in Indian lands8 4
Moreover, the Court in Kake stated specifically that the one provi-
sion of the disclaimer clause dealing with proprietary interest had
no bearing on the fishing rights dispute.8 5 The disclaimer clause in
section four provides, first, that the state of Alaska must disclaim
right and title to Indian property; second, that the United States
retains absolute jurisdiction and control over the Indian property;
and third, that the state must not tax the Indian property.86 The
first provision regarding the state's disclaiming title to the Indian
land pertains to "proprietary rather than governmental interest"
and in no way applies to the fishing rights dispute. 7 The third
clause, which precludes the state from taxing Indian lands, like-
wise does not bear on whether the state can regulate Indian fish-
ing rights.88
The Supreme Court in Kake found that the second provision,
in which the federal government retains "absolute jurisdiction and
control," simply did not extend to deny the state of Alaska its polit-
ical power to regulate off-reservation fishing.8 9 The Court did not
construe the disclaimer clause to grant Alaska unbridled political
power over the reservations so as to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion-a point touched upon in Kake,9 ° discussed in great detail
82. Id. The Hook court added that other jurisdictions with disclaimer language similar
to North Dakota's had relied on the proprietary-governmental distinction in Kake. Id. The
Hook court then listed a string of citations but did not provide or discuss the holdings in any
of them. Id.
83. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 570. The Hook court fails to even acknowledge the three
provision make-up of the disclaimer section to the Alaska Statehood Act. Id.
84. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1962).
85. Id. at 68. In as unequivocal terms as possible the Court stated that "[t]he first and
third provisions [of Alaska's disclaimer section] have nothing to do with this case .... Id.
86. Id. See supra note 80.
87. Kake, 369 U.S. at 69.
88. Id. For a discussion on how the Supreme Court required the consent of the people
of the United States as well as those of South Dakota, see supra note 66 (citing United States
v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903)).
89. Kake, 369 U.S. at 68. But see supra note 80 and accompanying text (ceding Indian
fishing rights to the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the federal government).
90. Kake, 369 U.S. at 69. See infra, note 91 and accompanying text for a
comprehensive discussion of congressional hearings on Alaska's disclaimer provision.
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during senate hearings on the statehood question,9' yet omitted
entirely by the Hook court.92 In fact, the United States Senate
emphasized during hearings on Alaska statehood that the federal
government would continue to retain absolute jurisdiction over
Indian reservation lands and the tribes residing on such lands.93
However, the Hook court simply concluded that the State of
91. Alaska Statehood: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 283 (1954).
Mr. Ralph A. Barney, representative of the justice department, had proposed a
disclaimer clause lifted from the Oklahoma enabling act. Id. The disclaimer, adapted for
Alaska, would in part provide that the people of the proposed state would forever disclaim
all right and title to all unappropriated lands as well as lands owned by or held for Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts, or any community of such natives whose lands shall be subject to the
jurisdiction and control of the United States. Id. Mr. Barney explained that the adaptation
to include "Eskimo or Aleut" would enable the federal government "to control and
supervise the Eskimos and Aleuts the same as Indians." Id. at 284. Moreover, Mr. Barney
added the phrase "or any community of such natives" to take care of those cases involving
community rather than individual property rights. Id.
New Mexico's Senator Anderson asked whether a person (race not specified) getting
into trouble on an Indian reservation would come under state or federal jurisdiction. Id. at
285. Mr. Barney replied that a federal police officer would exercise jurisdiction because of
the retention of federal jurisdiction (on New Mexico reservations). Id. Mr. Barney then
cited the holding in McBratney to emphasize the consequences of not reserving federal
jurisdiction in the act. Id. (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881))
(granting state jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian reservations for the failure of
Congress to explicitly reserve for itself jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed on
Indian reservations).
Oregon's Senator Cordon asked whether including the reservation of federal
jurisdiction language would take state political jurisdiction away from the Indian and other
Alaskan native lands. Id. at 285-86. Mr. Barney replied that the federal government would
retain its police power over the disclaimed lands while in no way impinging on the state's
exercise of its police power. Id. at 286. Moreover, not reserving exclusive federal
jurisdiction results in a waiver of such jurisdiction to the state. Id. Mr. Barney then
explained that the Statehood Act would give Alaska political jurisdiction, including all
contained in the term "police power" unless the federal government reserves or implies
exclusive jurisdiction. Id. The senate committee then agreed to limit the reservation of
federal jurisdiction to the disclaimed lands until title is extinguished by the federal
government. Id. at 287.
Wyoming's Senator Barrett pointed out that the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction over reservations in Wyoming. Id. Senator Cordon noted that the reservation
provision should apply to the title of government-held lands. Id. Mr. Barney proposed an
additional disclaimer in which nothing contained in Alaska's constitution would limit or
impair the rights of persons or property pertaining to the Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts or to
limit the authority of the federal government to make any law respecting such Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts. Id. However, the senate committee reacted negatively to the proposal,
fearing that the preservation of rights might tie up the development of Alaska for the next
decade. Id. at 288-89.
The three-tiered provision comprising section four of the Alaska Statehood Act
therefore included separate disclaimer provisions for proprietary interest in the title of
Indian lands, for reserving federal control over Indian lands, and for disclaiming the state's
taxing such Indian lands. For a discussion of what entails jurisdiction over Indian lands, see
COHEN, supra note 22, at 281 (defining jurisdiction as a function of both territory and
subject matter, i.e., respectively, the location of the events and the race of the parties).
92. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 570 (N.D. 1991). The Hook court merely lifted a
portion of the discussion regarding the senate committee's intention of not excluding the
state's political jurisdiction in providing for a disclaimer section to the Alaska Statehood Act.
Id. (quoting Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68 (1962) (citing Alaska
Statehood: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d
Cong. 2d Sess. 283 (1954)).
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Alaska had only relinquished proprietary interests in lands, failing
to recognize that Alaska's police power did not entail criminal
jurisdiction over Indian reservation lands.94
In addition to the inapplicability of Kake as to Alaska's dis-
claimer clause not reaching to deny state regulation of off-reserva-
tion fishing rights, Kake bears little if any factual relevance to
Hook. In fact, the Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm "n 15recalled that nothing in Kake would justify a
state's exercising jurisdiction to tax personal income of an Indian
derived exclusively on an Indian reservation because of the state's
disclaimer clause.96 More particularly, the Court in McClanahan
specifically noted that the Kake holding pertaining to fishing rights
of non-reservation Indians failed to provide guidelines for exercis-
ing state authority in areas set aside by treaty (or statute) for the
exclusive control and use of Indians on reservation lands.97
From its curious application of Kake on what Congress had
intended, the Hook court turned to its holding in Fournier v. Roed
for additional support.98 In Fournier, a Ramsey County deputy
sheriff entered the Fort Totten Indian Reservation and arrested
Fournier, an enrolled member of the Devils Lake Sioux Indian
Reservation.99 The deputy had no warrant and only filed a com-
plaint for auto theft after incarcerating Fournier in the Ramsey
County jail.10 At the conclusion of a preliminary hearing,
Fournier sought dismissal for the sheriff's lack of criminal jurisdic-
tion on the Indian reservation.' 01 Fournier argued that section
203 of North Dakota's constitution, in which the state disclaimed
absolute jurisdiction and control to the federal government, pre-
cluded the Ramsey County sheriff from exercising jurisdiction
94. Hook, 476 N.W.2d at 570. The Thlinget Indians did not reside on a reservation but
rather in state-chartered villages, thus falling under direct state jurisdiction on matters
other than fishing rights. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 62 (1962).
95. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
96. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 n.15 (1973) (referring
to Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68 (1962)).
97. Id. For an explanation on why the Kake holding does not apply to such a state as
North Dakota, see GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 571 (refusing in Kake to construe Alaska's
disclaimer so as to deny fishing rights to a non-reservation Indian village has little relevance
on other states in the Continental United States whose disclaimers have sought to protect
the Indians from encroachment of settlers and homesteaders).
98. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 570 (N.D. 1991) (referencing Fournier v. Roed, 161
N.w.2d 458 (N.D. 1968)).
99. Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 459 (N.D. 1968). The Fort Totten Indian
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over the Fort Totten Indian Reservation. 10 2 Both the trial and the
district court denied Fournier's motion, leading to an appeal to the
North Dakota Supreme Court. 10 3
The Fournier court acknowledged that the state legislature
had specifically declined to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
Indian reservation lands despite the people of North Dakota's vot-
ing to amend section 203 to grant such jurisdiction by legislative
action.'1 4 Moreover, the Fournier court recognized the two over-
riding reasons behind the legislature's declining to assume crimi-
nal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian reservation lands: First, the
majority of Indians objected to the state's jurisdiction; and second,
substantial state costs would result from the increased criminal
jurisdiction.10 5  While frankly conceding that the state had no
102. Id. at 462-63. For a recapitulation of the Enabling Act, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text; of section 203, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
103. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at 459.
104. Id. at 463-64. The Fournier court noted how Congress in 1953 had enacted Public
Law 280. Id. at 463. Section seven of Public Law 280, despite Enabling Act disclaimers,
extends federal consent to any state to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians on
Indian reservation land provided that the people of the state also consent. Id. (citing Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590). In 1958, the people of North
Dakota approved an amendment to section 203 of the state constitution which provides in
pertinent part that:
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim
all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the
United States, and that said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States, provided, however,
that the Legislative Assembly of the state of North Dakota may, upon such terms
and conditions as it shall adopt, provide for the acceptance of such jurisdiction
as may be delegated to the state by act of Congress; * * *
Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458, 463 (N.D. 1968) (citing 1959 N.D. Laws 430) (emphasis
added by court).
105. Id. at 464 (citing S. Con. Res. RR, 37th N.D. Leg. Sess.).
The Fournier court mentioned that the legislature had authorized a feasibility study for
state assumption of jurisdiction over Indian reservation lands. Id. (alluding to S. Con. Res.
RR, 37th N.D. Leg. Sess. (1961) (lacking the financial resources precludes assumption of
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians on Indian reservation land without federal
assistance and necessitates a financial impact analysis by the legislative research
committee)). In recommending against assuming criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands,
the legislative research committee conducted a series of hearings on reservations and in
reservation counties. REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMiTTEE, 38th Leg. Sess. 37 (1963). The committee determined that Indians in North
Dakota opposed state jurisdiction of Indians on Indian reservation land. Id. Moreover, the
committee noted that assumption of criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservation lands
would give rise to a "very expensive proposition." Id. The counties and cities could not
provide the additional personnel without state assistance. Id. at 37-38. The state unlikely
could afford to subsidize the cities and counties. Id. at 38. The committee therefore
recommended that "criminal jurisdiction be left in the hands of the [flederal [g]overnment
and the tribes." Id.
The Fournier court further noted that the North Dakota legislature in 1963 enacted
Senate Bill 30, thereby putting the state in accord with Public Law 280. Fournier, 161
N.W.2d at 464 (citing 1963 N.D. Laws, S.B. 30, ch. 242 (providing only for civil jurisdiction
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jurisdiction over Indians on reservation land for crimes committed
off the reservation, the Fournier court nevertheless asserted such
jurisdiction in the name of "law and order.' 10 6
In an attempt to consolidate this raw exercise of power, the
Fournier court relied on the infringement test that the Supreme
Court set out in Williams v. Lee.' 7  In Williams, the state's exer-
cising civil jurisdiction turned on whether doing so infringed on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them.108 Without explaining why, the Fournier court
merely concluded that a state law enforcement officer's entering a
reservation and seizing an Indian did not interfere with the reser-
vation's self government or otherwise impair any right granted to
defendant Fournier under federal law or treaty.10 9
But the Fournier court's conclusion of granting state criminal
jurisdiction over an Indian on Indian reservation land earmarks
where the inquiry begins for defendants Fournier and Hook.'1 0
Considering defendant Fournier, the North Dakota Supreme
over Indians on Indian lands subject to Indians first giving consent and specifically failing to
provide for assumption of criminal jurisdiction)). Senate Bill 30 provided the means for
individual or tribal acceptance of state jurisdiction over civil matters on Indian reservations.
Id. The legislature, following the recommendations of its research committee, permitted
individual Indians to first consent before the state could exercise civil jurisdiction. Id. at
463-64. However, the bill conspicuously failed to permit the state to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands. Id. The Fournier court noted that in no
subsequent session has the legislature acted to assume criminal jurisdiction over Indian
lands. Id. at 464. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-01 (1991) (providing for civil assumption of
jurisdiction upon acceptance by the Indians but specifically noting of its not providing a
method by which the state can assume criminal jurisdiction over an Indian reservation).
The Fournier court then commented that in 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights
Act which subsequently requires consent of the Indians for the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction. Fournier, 161 N.W. 2d at 464 (citing Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284,
Title IV, §§ 401-06, 82 Stat. 73). See G. Kenneth Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 10 AZ. L. REV. 617,641 (1968)(explaining how title four of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, which requires Indian consent by a majority vote of the tribe before state
assumption of jurisdiction, corrected the major oversight of Public Law 280).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (predicting a doubling of law enforcement
costs in affected South Dakota counties under Public Law 280).
106. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at 465. The Fournier court further required that someone
demonstrate how the Constitution, treaties, or federal enactments prevent the state of
North Dakota from exercising jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands. Id. Interestingly,
the Fournier court made no attempt to resurrect the Act of May 31, 1946, as possible
justification for exercising criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands.
107. Id. at 467 (referring to Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
108. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Non-Indian Williams, operating a trading
post on the Navajo reservation, sought a civil judgment in state court against Indian Lee for
non-payment of bills due. Id. at 217-18. Lee moved to dismiss since jurisdiction resided in
tribal rather than state courts. Id. at 218. However, Arizona state trial and supreme courts
permitted non-Indians to civilly sue Indians in state court in the absence of specific federal
legislation to the contrary. Id. But the Supreme Court viewed itself as retaining exclusive
tribal or Congress-designated jurisdiction for crimes involving Indians. Id. at 220 n.5. Thus,
unless Congress has acted, the Court determines whether the state infringes on the tribe's
power to make its own laws and govern itself accordingly. Id. at 220.
109. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at 467.
110. See infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text for jurisdictional questions
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Court has since acknowledged that its common law gives defer-
ence to statutory enactments of the legislature."' The legislature,
for want of Indian consent and because of significant cost consider-
ations, by statute has declined to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over Indians on Indian reservation land.112
In addition to overriding legislative enactments, the Fournier
court had not considered its own precedent in State ex rel.
Tompton v. Denoyer.1 3 The Denoyer court denied the state the
right to enter federal land tracts for making an arrest on a crime
committed elsewhere." 4 Denoyer therefore means that the state
may only enter onto such lands when the federal government has
specifically reserved such a right for the state," 5 as Congress did
with Public Law 280. Yet the Fournier court conceded that the
state specifically declined to reserve such a right in complying
with Public Law 280.116
In the absence of the North Dakota legislature's assuming
criminal jurisdiction over a reservation, a state peace officer could
have sought extradition of Fournier." 7 In fact, defendant
Fournier claimed that his seizure violated an extradition provision
surrounding defendant Fournier; infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text for
jurisdictional questions surrounding defendant Hook.
111. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-06 (1987) (denying the existence in North Dakota of
the common law where the code declares the law). The North Dakota Supreme Court, in
Davis v. O'Keefe, noted that the legislature has made no provision for the state to assume
criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian land. Davis v. O'Keefe, 283 N.W.2d 73, 75 n.1
(N.D. 1979). Moreover, the O'Keefe court acknowledged that the legislature had provided
a means for state assumption of civil jurisdiction over Indians on Indian reservation lands
but not for criminal jurisdiction. Id. A note in the North Dakota Century Code
acknowledges the code's lack of provision for criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian
reservation lands. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-01 (1991). The Fournier court conceded that
the legislature in the 1963 session enacted Senate Bill 30, legislation in which the state
failed to provide for criminal jurisdiction and has since refused to take any affirmative steps
for assuming criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at
464.
112. Id.
113. 72 N.W. 1014 (N.D. 1897).
114. Id. at 1016. The Denoyer court noted how those occupying federal lands do not
qualify as residents of any state whose lands surround the federal tract. Id. Moreover, the
state has no jurisdiction over such federal property. Id.
115. Id. More particularly, the Denoyer court stated that, unless Congress specifically
reserves a right of access or jurisdiction, state officials cannot enter federal property in order
to execute an arrest warrant or any other civil process. Id. For a brief discussion on how
North Dakota declined to exercise a specific reservation of criminal jurisdiction over
federally protected Indian lands as provided for in Public Law 280, see supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
116. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at 464.
117. But see Bruce E. Bohlman, Recent Cases, 45 N.D. L. REV., 430, 438-39 (1969)
(disputing the state's right to extradite fugitives from Indian reservations in view of the
tribe's lack of legal status to extradite from state territories (citing Ex Parte Morgan, 20 F.
298, 306 (W.D. Ark. 1883); quoting Extradition of Indian Fugitives to Reservations Where
Offense Was Committed, 57 Interior Dec. 344, 345 (1941)).
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in the Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Code." 8 However, a concurring
opinion in Fournier construed the tribal extradition provision as
inapplicable." 9 Yet a 1941 Interior Department ruling precludes
states from extraditing Indian defendants from reservation lands
without specific authorization.12 0  The Interior Department rul-
ing, penned by then Acting Solicitor General Felix S. Cohen, runs
consistent with what the Denoyer court held nearly fifty years ear-
lier: The state may only exercise jurisdiction over Indians on
Indian lands with a specific reservation of authority generally in
the form of a legislatively-enacted statute.' 21
E. STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS ON INDIAN LANDS
IN LIGHT OF CURRENT FEDERAL POLICIES
The confusion arising from the holdings in Fournier and Hook
suggest a need to briefly trace recent changes in federal policy
toward Indians and Indian lands.122 Between 1943 and 1961, the
118. Fournier, 161 N.W.2d at 476 (Knudson, J., concurring specially).
119. Id. Concurring Justice Knudson quoted the extradition section of the Devils Lake
Tribal Code, indicating that it applied to offenses committed on reservations only. Id.
Knudson states that, since the code says nothing about extraditing fugitives for crimes
committed off the reservation, further consideration is precluded. Id. Knudson did not
attempt to understand the intent of those who drafted the extradition section of the tribal
code, a surprising oversight in view of the paramount issue then pending regarding possible
interference in tribal self-government. Moreover, neither Knudson nor the majority in
Fournier followed the rules of statutory construction that the Supreme Court has required
in interpreting treaties and statutes affecting Indians. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text (construing liberally so as to favor increased Indian rights).
120. BOHLMAN, supra note 117, at 439 (quoting Extradition of Indian Fugitives to
Reservations Where Offense Was Committed, 57 Interior Dec. 344, 345 (1941)). The
opinion, rendered by Cohen, indicates that a tribe may extradite Indians from state lands
to the extent that states may extradite Indians from Indian lands. Extradition of Indian
Fugitives to Reservations Where Offense Was Committed, 57 Interior Dec. 344, 345 (1941).
In any case, unless state officers have authorization to extradite from Indian reservations,
tribes may not extradite Indian fugitives on state lands. Id. The reverse would logically
follow: the state may not extradite from Indian reservations if reservation authorities cannot
extradite suspected Indians from state lands.
121. Id. See State ex rel. Tompton v. Denoyer, 72 N.W, 1014, 1016 (N.D. 1897)
(permitting state officials to enter tracts of federal or Indian land in order to make an arrest
only when the privileges and immunities of state law so specially reserve); See supra notes
107-109 and accompanying text; BOHLMAN, supra note 117, at 434-35 (citing 39 Stat. 243
(1916); 16 U.S.C. § 95 (1974) (permitting Washington state civil or criminal process over
federal park lands despite exclusive federal jurisdiction because of Washington's having
enacted state statutes)).
122. See GOLDBERG, supra note 27, at 535. Court decisions have unequivocally re-
affirmed Congress's plenary power over Indian wards. Id. However, confusion arises over
the allocation of congressional power between the states and Indian tribes when Congress
has not acted. Id. The federal government has embraced alternating models, shifting from
making Indians an integral part of states to retaining the unique status of Indians through
tribal autonomy. Id. at 536. Public Law 280 seemed to reflect the ambivalence between
these two policies. Id. at 546. Expressing 'grave doubts' for not requiring Indian consent
before signing Public Law 280 in 1953, President Eisenhower recommended an immediate
amendment to include some mechanism for tribal self-determination on the issue of state
jurisdiction. Id. at n.54 (citing W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED BUSINESS 186 (1966)). The amendment, which President Eisenhower had
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federal government pursued a policy of termination of tribal
dependency with the view toward state assimilation of Indians.12 3
During the "termination" era, Congress passed such laws as the
Act of May 31, 1946, and in particular Public Law 280,124 both of
which provided the legal but not the financial means for states to
assume jurisdiction over Indians on Indian reservation lands. In its
haste to sever ties with the Indians, Congress did not seek the con-
sent of the affected tribes. 12 5
The federal government began to abandon the termination
policy in 1958, focusing instead on Indian self-determination.' 2
6
urged, took Congress 15 years to produce, resulting in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
particularly section 406. Section 406 requires a majority vote of the tribe before states not
in compliance with Public Law 280 could assume jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands.
Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Public Law 90-284, § 406, 82 Stat. 80 (codified as 25 U.S.C. 1321
(1988)).
123. COHEN, supra note 22, at 152. Cohen defined 'termination' in a narrow sense as
severing the special relationship between tribes and the federal government which
Congress did not officially adopt until 1953. Id. One commentator referred to the post-war
period of termination as one of "optimism, faith in [both] free enterprise [and] local
government." Id. at 156 (citing Hasse, Termination and Assimilation: Federal Indian Policy
1943 to 1961, 92 (1974) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington State University)).
In 1952, the House of Representatives passed a resolution which required that its interior
committee formulate legislative proposals designed to terminate all federal control over
Indians as soon as possible. Id. at 170 (citing H.R. Res. 698, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CONG.
REC. 8788 (1952)).
124. COHEN, supra note 22, at 175-76. The Act of May 31, 1946, applied only to Devils
Lake Sioux Indian Reservation. Id. at 176. However, Congress had passed similar measures
on behalf of Kansas in 1940 and Iowa in 1948. Id. (referencing, respectively, Act of June 8,
1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249; Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161). Public Law 280
provided for mandatory transfer of criminal and civil jurisdiction to California, Minnesota
(excepting Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (excepting Warm Springs
Reservation), and Wisconsin (excepting Menominee Reservation). Id. (citing Act of Aug. 15,
1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588-89 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988))). Additionally, Public
Law 280 enabled all other states the option of assuming jurisdiction over Indians on Indian
lands at some point in the future. Id. Those states having constitutional or enabling act
disclaimer clauses had to amend such disclaimers as a precondition for assuming
jurisdiction. Id. (citing Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1989), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1988), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (1988)). States not constrained constitutionally or statutorily with disclaimer sections
could assume jurisdiction based on legislative enactment. Id. (citing Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988))).
125. COHEN, supra note 22, at 177. Indians, in voicing their criticism to Public Law
280 for its failure to require Indian consent before state assumption of jurisdiction over
Indians on Indian lands, urged President Eisenhower to veto the bill. Id. (referencing SEC.
INT. ANN. REP. 243 (1954)).
126. Id. at 180.
Because of widespread criticism particularly from Congress, President Eisenhower
sounded a full scale retreat from the termination charge sounded barely five years
previously. Id. at 182. The interior secretary officially announced the end of coercive
termination during a radio broadcast in 1958, permitting the termination of a tribe only
upon consent of its members. Id.
Cohen explained that the notion of Indian tribes as basic governmental units of Indian
policy undergirds the on-going self-determination era. Id. at 180. Congressional re-
organization efforts of the 1930s resuscitated tribal governments. Id. By Congressional
action in the 1970s, tribal government has grown and expanded. Id.
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Congressional leaders, expressing concern over the loss of Indian
land during termination, repudiated House Concurrent Resolution
108, an earlier unanimous resolution calling for complete tribal
assimilation into state government.12 7
At the outset of this era of congressional recognition came the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, particularly Title IV which
requires tribal consent through self-determination as a pre-condi-
tion for state assumption of jurisdiction, but little else.' 28 States
not having done so previously could assume criminal jurisdiction
over a particular tribe based on the consent of the majority of tri-
bal members. 129 But in North Dakota, the legislature has espe-
cially declined to exercise such authority.' 30
In passing Public Law 280 during the termination era, Con-
gress granted five states criminal jurisdiction over Indians on
Indian reservations without requiring constitutional or statutory
modification of state disclaimer sections.' 3 ' Might not Congress
have similarly vested North Dakota with criminal jurisdiction over
127. COHEN, supra note 22, at 171. Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution in
1953 shortly before Public Law 280. Id. at 181. An interior committee of the Senate
discovered that between 1948 and 1950 approximately 2.6 million acres of Indian land
passed to non-Indians; between 1953 and 1957, another 1.8 million acres passed. Id. at 181-
82 n.9. In 1953, Congress unanimously passed House Concurrent Resolution 108. Id. at
171-72 (citing H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953)). In 1957, both
houses of Congress proposed a resolution, repudiating House Concurrent Resolution 108
and requiring future state adoption of Public Law 280 only with Indian consent. Id. at 181
(citing Federal Indian Policy: Hearings on S. Con. Res. 3, S. 331, and S. 809 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 267 (Mar. 27, May 13 & 16, Jun. 17, Jul. 1 & 22, 1957)). However, Congress
did not act on its proposal of repudiating its 1953 termination resolution until 1973. Id. at
181 n.7, 186-87 n.67. At President Nixon's prodding, Congress in 1970 formally repudiated
House Concurrent Resolution 108 which had called for complete Indian assimilation by the
states. Id. at 185-86 (referencing President Richard M. Nixon's Special Message to Congress
on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564, 567 (1970)).
One historian characterized the 1943-61 termination period as the government's "most
concerted drive against Indian property and Indian survival since the [mass] removals" to
the West after 1830 and the attempt at disenfranchising tribes and reservations after 1887.
Id. at 153 (referring to A. DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 349
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970)). See Brief of Appellant A-19, State v. Hook,
476 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1991) (No. 900280-900282) (available at University of North Dakota
Thormodsgard Law Library) (describing Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation, which
began under the 1867 treaty with roughly 245,141 acres, as having dwindled to 59,721
acres in 1990).
128. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
129. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968).
130. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (indicating the reasons for the North
Dakota Legislature's declining to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands
in enacting Public Law 280 legislation).
131. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988)) (permitting California, Minnesota (excepting the Red Lake
Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (excepting Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin
(excepting Menominee Reservation) to assume criminal jurisdiction over all Indians on
Indian lands within each state, respectively).
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Indians on Indian lands in the Act of May 31, 1946, without the
state's having to amend its constitutional disclaimer section?
32
Unlike the five states granted jurisdiction by unilateral congres-
sional legislation in Public Law 280, North Dakota and ten other
states entered the union between 1889 and 1959 with disclaimer
baggage in tow.' 33 These eleven candidates for statehood had to
disclaim jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands as a pre-condi-
tion for admission. 134 Having complied by inserting disclaimer
clauses into their constitutions or statutory enabling acts, ten of
these eleven states had to remove the same disclaimers before
exercising jurisdiction which Congress offered in Public Law
280.13 However, the Supreme Court decided in Washington v.
Yakima Indian Nation that, if state law required a constitutional
amendment of its disclaimer section in order to comply with Pub-
lic Law 280, then the affected states must so amend.' 3 6 But a state
not needing to amend its constitution must still take positive state
legislative action before implementing federal Public Law 280 leg-
islation.' 37  Thus, the Supreme Court in 1978 interpreted the lan-
guage of section six in Public Law 280 as not mandating a
constitutional amendment to change the disclaimer section before
assuming jurisdiction and that state legislative action could
suffice. 138
132. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (reciting the 1946 Act).
133. COHEN, supra note 22, at 368. The eleven states with disclaimer sections include
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Oklahoma,
Arizona, Alaska, and New Mexico. Id. at 368 n. 175. However, Wyoming and Idaho entered
the union based on enabling acts in federal law even though such federal legislation had the
same effect in limiting these two states as well as the other nine regarding the limit of
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian land. Id.
134. Id.
135. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1988)). See S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1953)
(describing as 'legal impediments' state disclaimer sections which will require consent of
the people for eight states which entered the union under the Enabling Act in order to
amend state constitutions before assuming jurisdiction under Public Law 280). Of the
eleven states with disclaimer sections in their constitutions or statutes, Alaska mandatorily
assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280 while still a territory but under different
legislation and at a later date. COHEN, supra note 22, at 369 n.182 (citing Act of Aug. 8,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615). The Territory of Alaska had not entered into a compact with the
federal government before assuming jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands in 1958. Id.
at 369 n. 182. The disclaiming compact in which Alaska agreed to cede political jurisdiction
of Indians and Indian lands back to the federal government took effect after the equivalent
of Public Law 280 became operational in Alaska. Id.
136. 439 U.S. 463, 493 (1979). The Court deferred to state courts for determining
whether the state should amend its constitution or merely enact legislation. Id.
Washington state courts had construed section six of Public Law 280 as permitting a
legislative act to amend the disclaimer language contained in the state constitution. Id. at
467.
137. Yakima, 439 U.S. at 493.
138. Id. at 485.
The Court found too much tentativeness in the section's language to conclude that
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The North Dakota State Bar Association, the North Dakota
State Attorney General, and the North Dakota Supreme Court in
1955 found that the compact language in the state constitution
necessitated amending. 139  These related state entities viewed
amending the constitutional disclaimer section as essential so that
the people could consent to their exercising criminal jurisdiction
over Indians on Indian land under the 1946 Act as well as under
Public Law 280.141 North Dakota amended its state constitution
by popular vote to comply with Public Law 280 though the legisla-
ture subsequently declined to accept criminal jurisdiction over
Indians on Indian lands.' 4 1 As in Yakima, Congress's passing the,
Act of May 31, 1946, did not mandate the state's amending its con-
Congress had required Enabling Act states such as Washington and North Dakota to amend
their constitutions. See id. Furthermore, the Court construed the phrase in section six in
which the people of a given state had Congress's permission to amend state constitutions
"where necessary" as having do to so only if state law so requires. Id. at 483-84. But one
must wonder if the plainer meaning of the phrase "'where necessary" did not reflect
Congress's understanding that eight of the Enabling Act states had disclaimer clauses in
their constitutions while two others relied on statute. See COHEN, supra note 22, at 368
n.175; supra note 133 and accompanying text (distinguishing the nine states with
constitutional disclaimers from the two with statutory disclaimers). If so, then the Court has
misconstrued the plain meaning of section six or has rendered a decision in Yakima from an
outcome-determinative perspective. The Court in Yakima viewed the phrase "consent of
the people" in section six as not necessarily referring to a general referendum where the
people by popular vote amend the state constitution but to legislative enactments as well.
Yakima, 439 U.S. at 487-88. The Court considered the legislative history of Public Law 280
as not embracing mandatory constitutional amendments of disclaimer sections for Enabling
Act states. Id. at 491. For example, while conceding that members of a congressional
interior committee viewed section six as legally requiring Enabling Act states to amend
their constitutions before assuming jurisdiction under Public Law 280, the Court
nonetheless found no evidence that the committee intended to make section six a
requirement for state constitutional amendments. Id. at 492-93.
Conversely, Assistant Interior Department Secretary Orme Lewis concluded that,
because of the legal impediment of constitutional disclaimers expressly ceding jurisdiction
over Indian lands to the federal government, the people of each state apparently would be
required to amend the state constitution before legally assuming jurisdiction under section
six of Public Law 280. S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1953). Of course, one could
take issue with the 'apparently' expression of Lewis as too tentative to suggest that Congress
made amendments to constitutional disclaimer sections mandatory in section six of Public
Law 280. For the precise language of section six, see Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-
280, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1988)).
139. See BENCH AND BAR, supra note 53, at 463, 469 (recommending amending the
state constitution before assuming criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands in
order to comply with Public Law 280); BRIEF OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, supra note 15,
at 16-18 (urging the North Dakota Supreme Court to require that North Dakota amend its
state constitution before exercising jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands as provided for
by Act of May 31, 1946, and Public Law 280); supra notes 17-53 and accompanying text
(discussing the Lohnes holding and attending rationale).
140. See BENCH AND BAR, supra note 53, at 469 (referring to the North Dakota State
Bar's recommendations, the North Dakota State Attorney General's recommendations, and
the holding in Lohnes, the latter of which required amending the state constitution before
the state could assume criminal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian reservation lands).
141. N.D. CONST. art LXVIII (also known as section 203), amended by S. Con. Res Q,
ch. 403, 1957 N.D. Sess. Laws 792, approved, June 24, 1958, ch. 430, 1959 N.D. Sess. Laws
843. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (declining to exercise criminal jurisdiction
legislatively after amending its state constitutional disclaimer section); COHEN, supra note
22, at 369 n.181 (identifying North Dakota as the only state of the eleven Enabling Act
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stitutional disclaimer section. 142  Moreover, no evidence exists to
indicate that Congress intended to break its compact with the
state of North Dakota and require state criminal jurisdiction over
the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation under the Act of May 31,
1946, without the state's first giving consent.' 4 3 Accordingly, state
police and state courts should not exercise jurisdiction over Indi-
ans on the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation in North Dakota
absent state legislative action.
In addition to recent federal legislative and executive policy
changes, the judicial branch has also modified its approach to juris-
dictional questions by looking particularly toward their effect on
tribal self-determination. Assuming a grant of certiorari by the
Supreme Court to review Hook, one could argue for application of
the infringement test of Williams to the facts in Hook.' 44 More-
over, in arguing before the Supreme Court, one might seek the
Court's reaffirmation of the Worcester policy cited in Williams:
Namely, that state laws have no effect on Indian lands, and state
citizens may not enter onto Indian lands absent permission from
the tribe or Congress. 145 As the Court had noted in Williams, the
modification of the Worcester policy enabled the state to punish
non-Indians committing crimes on Indian lands. 146  But crimes
states to amend its state constitution in response to Public Law 280 requirements and the
Lohnes decision).
142. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (finding in Yakima that Public
Law 280 does not mandate that Enabling Act states constitutionally amend disclaimer
sections); supra note 15 and accompanying text (containing the precise language of the
1946 act).
143. See COHEN, supra note 22, at 374 n.229 (failing to find any intent that Congress
intended to break the compact and 'require state jurisdiction without state consent, the
Lohnes result seems correct).
144. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
For a recitation of the facts and holding in Williams, see supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
Reviewing the Hook decision would not mark the first time that the United States
Supreme Court has questioned the North Dakota Supreme Court decision affecting Indian
rights. For two instances involving the same case where the United States Supreme Court
had to reverse the North Dakota Supreme Court for its attempting to exercise jurisdiction
over Indians on Indian land at the expense of their equal protection, see Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138 (1984); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold
Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986). In the second case, the Supreme Court preempted North
Dakota's interest of exacting Indian consent for the state's exercising jurisdiction over
Indians as a pre-condition to their having standing in state courts. Wold, 467 U.S. at 888.
The Court relied on the pre-emption doctrine to find an overriding federal interest of equal
access to courts for all citizens. Id. at 887. The Court also took the occasion to specifically
overrule Vermillion in which the North Dakota Supreme Court had asserted civil
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands despite the legislature's conditioning state
jurisdiction on the Indians giving their consent. Wold, 467 U.S. at 880 (referencing
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957)).
145. Williams, 358 U.S. at 219 (referencing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561
(1832)).
146. Id. at 220. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing among others,
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involving Indians on Indian lands would fall exclusively to federal
jurisdiction unless Congress says otherwise. 47 In the absence of
such a congressional enactment, the Court could determine
whether any state action infringes on the tribe's power to make its
own laws in order to govern its members. 4 '
The Court in United States v. Wheeler held that the powers of
tribes to govern relations among members do not dissipate as a
result of the tribe's dependent status.149 Furthermore, the power
to prescribe internal criminal laws involves only the relations
among tribal members. 150 Cohen has noted that the determina-
tive factor for permitting the exercise of tribal power turns on
whether "the matter falls within the ambit of internal self-govern-
ment."151 In other words, the question becomes: Does a state
police officer who forcibly removes an enrolled member of the
Devils Lake Tribe from the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation
for an offense committed on the reservation and in the presence of
fully certified tribal police strike at the core of tribal self-
government?
The answer to this infringement issue lies in examining the
recent development of tribal self-government on the Devils Lake
reservation. The Devils Lake Sioux Tribe has responded to the
major federal policy goal of enhanced tribal self-government.
Bureau of Indian Affairs police maintain the peace on the Devils
Lake Indian Sioux Reservation. Devils Lake Sioux Tribe has devel-
oped and actively relies on a comprehensive civil and criminal
code, one that underwent a major revision in 1988.152 Title six of
the tribal code addresses such violations as driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol and driving on a suspended license.'53 Moreover,
the one instance of the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation, where state courts may
exercise criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian on Indian reservation lands).
147. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing
federal statutes which provide for federal jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands).
148. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. As an example of the Public Law 280 congressional
enactment which North Dakota has specifically declined to exercise, see supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
149. 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)
(extending the powers of a tribe to cover both their members and their territory).
150. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326-27.
151. See COHEN, supra note 22, at 246.
152. See, e.g., 1 DEVILS LAKE Sioux TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE, Titles I-IV, §§ 1-1-
101 through 16-1-106 (1988) (ranging from general provisions in title one, criminal actions
in title three, civil actions in title four, motor vehicles in title six, et seq.).
153. Id. § 6-6-122 (sentencing any Indian apprehended for and found guilty of driving
on a court-suspended license to up to sixth months in jail and a $300 fine or both); id. § 6-6-
126 (presuming an Indian to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor whose percent by
weight of alcohol in the blood reads 0.10 or above and imposing a maximum sentence of 90
days in jail, a $500 fine, and suspension of the driving privilege for up to one year for a third
offense within two years). Of course, officer Buchli had only placed Hook under arrest at
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the Devils Lake Tribal Court can impose sentences up to a year in
jail and a $5,000 fine for each count, sufficient remedies for the
offenses charged against Hook. 15 4 The Devils Lake Sioux Tribe
Law & Order Code also contains an extradition provision which
the tribal court has used on occasion.', 5 Finally, the Devils Lake
Sioux Indian Reservation houses a secured detention facility
staffed full-time by five jailers. 15 6 Thus, the Devils Lake Sioux
Tribe effectively governs itself by exercising criminal jurisdiction
over its enrolled members for offenses committed on the reserva-
tion.15 7 The state therefore has no need to assume criminal juris-
diction over Indians on Indian lands.
V. IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM HOOK
In view of federal acts of Congress and holdings of the Court
recognizing tribal self-government in criminal matters affecting
tribal members, state highway officer Buchli infringed on tribal
self-government when he entered the reservation, took Hook off
the reservation in the presence of sworn tribal officers of the law,
ignored tribal extradition procedures, and presented Hook to a
North Dakota state court. Furthermore, state courts interfered
with tribal self-government by continuing to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over Hook in total disregard of the Devils Lake tribal
code, tribal court, and tribal incarceration facility. 5" Lastly, the
current federal policy of increasing tribal self-government
requires preempting North Dakota state police and courts from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs-staffed road-block for the misdemeanor charge of fleeing from
a peace officer. State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d 565, 565 (N.D. 1991). However, under the
Assimilated Crimes Act, the federal courts could have accepted jurisdiction once the
Bureau of Indian Affairs police had taken Hook into custody. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
154. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (amending the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 to increase punishment to up to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine if not both).
155. 1 DEVILS LAKE Sioux TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE, Title III, § 3-9-101 (1988)
(permitting an enrolled member of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe to undergo extradition for a
charge beyond the jurisdiction of the tribal court).
156. See Randall Howell, Fort Totten Jail Slated to Reopen Soon, OUATE HO, May 1,
1991, at 27 (forecasting the jail's reopening within 30 days with five jailers following its
renovation under Bureau of Indian Affairs supervision).
157. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959). The Court noted how Congress and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs had assisted in strengthening the Navajo tribal self-government
and its courts, resulting in significant improvement in its legal system through training and
resource development. Id. The record at Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation reflects
similar federal assistance in increasing tribal self-government, particularly its exercise of
criminal jurisdiction. See Gordon K. Knight, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State
Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1399 (1985) (viewing the establishment of tribal courts as
central to the revitalization characteristic of moving toward tribal self-determination).
158. See COHEN, supra note 22, at 350. Cohen grants a strong state interest in
exercising at least civil jurisdiction over tribes lacking laws or any form of tribal self-
government, clearly not the case on Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation. Id.
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interfering where its state legislature has steadfastly declined to
authorize jurisdiction.15 9
Illustrating judicial recognition of tribal self-government, the
tenth circuit appellate court in Ross v. Neff recently denied state
jurisdiction to seize an Indian on Indian land under circumstances
similar to Hook.160 A deputy county sheriff, entering reservation
property in response to a traffic control service request, arrested
Ross on drunk and disorderly charges.' 6' The appellate court in
Ross defined Indian country as subject to exclusive federal or tribal
criminal jurisdiction unless Congress has provided otherwise.' 62
The Ross court further noted how Congress had provided a statu-
tory means in Public Law 280 for a state to assume criminal juris-
diction over Indian country.' 6 3  However, like Arizona in
Williams, Oklahoma in Ross had not taken the legislative steps
necessary to assume jurisdiction over Indian country.164 Even so,
Oklahoma argued that its asserting criminal jurisdiction over Indi-
ans on Indian lands would not infringe on tribal interests.' 65
The tenth circuit court viewed the Williams infringement
test as applicable principally in civil cases and the federal law as
specifically provided for either federal or tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion over the drunkenness charge against Ross.'6 Moreover, the
court in Ross said that the Supreme Court has expressly limited
state criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands to non-Indians.'67 In
discharging the drunkenness charge against Ross for want of police
jurisdiction, the tenth circuit stated that avenues to exercise juris-
diction over Indians on Indian lands must come from the legisla-
ture rather than courts or some fiat by county government.' 68
159. See supra note 105 and accompanying text for a explanation on the legislature's
refusal to authorize state criminal jurisdiction. Over a question of civil jurisdiction, the
Court did not hesitate to find that permitting Arizona to exercise jurisdiction would cut
asunder tribal court authority over reservation affairs, thus infringing on the right of the
Navajo Nation to govern itself. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1959). Arizona had
not accepted jurisdiction under Public Law 280 in view of the likely significant attending
financial burdens. Id.
160. Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990).
161. Id. at 1352.
162. Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
163. Id. (citing to 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988) (permitting states to assume criminal
jurisdiction over Indian lands with tribal consent, thus amending Public Law 280)).
164. Id. The tenth circuit court specifically stated that the sheriff had no jurisdiction to
enter the reservation and arrest Ross. Id. See supra note 159 and accompanying text
(indicating Arizona's failure to enact jurisdictional legislation pursuant to Public Law 280).
165. Ross, 905 F.2d at 1352.
166. Id. at 1352-53 (citing to 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988) (permitting federal police to
'borrow' from state law to exercise jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands)).
167. Id. at 1353 (alluding to Solem v. Barrett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984)).
168. Id. The mere presence of a void in enforcement does not empower local law
enforcement to enter onto tribal land. Id. See also State v. Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d
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VI. CONCLUSION
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Hook sought through
common law to impose its political will on the state of North
Dakota by mandating the exercise of misdemeanor criminal juris-
diction over Indians on Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation land.
Yet the North Dakota legislature, in enacting Public Law 280 leg-
islation, declined to exercise criminal jurisdiction because the Indi-
ans do not wish it and further because of the major financial
burden that would result. But Indians on the Devils Lake Sioux
Indian Reservation have not petitioned for nor consented to state
criminal jurisdiction, the tribal court having given formal written
notice to the North Dakota State Highway Patrol that it lacked
jurisdiction on the reservation. More importantly, tribal courts
have always operated in the past and continue to do so in the pres-
ent as part of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe's drive toward self-
determination. A forum of law should respect the will of the peo-
ple of the state of North Dakota through their representative gov-
ernment as well as the will of the Indian people of the Devils Lake
Sioux Tribe.
Congress, previously having sought to terminate tribal rights
in the 1940s and early 1950s, has recognized the need for tribal
self-government since the late 1950s. Congress has twice repudi-
ated its intent in 1953 to abandon wholesale the tribes to the juris-
diction of state government. The development of tribal courts and
tribal law embodies the epitome of tribal self-determination, the
aspiration of which even the Supreme Court has recently
recognized.169
When Congress has passed a statute during the assimilationist
and termination eras, even a statute suggesting a general intent to
curtail tribal powers, the Court will not strain to implement a pol-
icy which Congress has since rejected.1 70  Congress has since
rejected its attempt to forcibly assimilate such Indians as those of
the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe into the machinery of such state gov-
ernments as North Dakota's. The conclusion seems inescapable.
463, 467 (S.D. 1990) (denying the state criminal jurisdiction to pursue an Indian onto Indian
country in view of the state's failing to comport with the purpose of Public Law 280 by only
assuming limited jurisdiction over roads on reservation property but nothing else); Benally
v. Marcum, 553 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (N.M. 1976) (viewing a violation of due process and
suppressing illegal fruits resulting from state police's relying on fresh pursuit to seize an
Indian on Indian land rather than follow the tribe's extradition procedures).
169. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-17 (1987) (promoting self-
government encompasses the development of the entire tribal court system).
170. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 n.14 (1976).
1992] 725

